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SIXTH AMENDMENT-PUBLIC TRIAL
GUARANTEE APPLIES TO PRETRIAL
SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
Waler v. Georgia, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Waller v. Georgia,1 the Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment guarantee of a public trial for criminal defendants ap-
plies to suppression hearings. 2 This Note will first examine the im-
portant policy considerations that underlie the right to a public trial.
Next, it will examine the Waller decision in light of these policies.
Then, it will argue that although the Court correctly decided Waller,
the Court's test for ascertaining the constitutionality of closure or-
ders is ambiguous. Finally, this Note will advance more specific
guidelines for trial courts to utilize in deciding the propriety of clo-
sure orders in suppression hearings.
II. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1982, a Georgia trial court convicted petitioners Guy Waller,
Clarence Cole, and thirty-five others of commercial gambling and
communicating gambling information in violation of Georgia statu-
tory law.3 The Georgia authorities obtained evidence of the gam-
bling activities through the use of court authorized wiretaps and
search warrants. 4 Prior to the trial of Petitioners and thirteen
others, Petitioners moved to suppress the wiretaps and evidence
seized in the searches, arguing that the warrants authorizing the
wiretaps lacked probable cause and were based on overly general
information, and that the searches were indiscriminate, exploratory,
and general. 5 The state moved to exclude the public from the sup-
' 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984).
2 Id. at 2216.
3 See Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 124, 303 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2210 (1984) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2703, -2706 (1983)). Petitioners, along with
hundreds of others, participated in a telephone lottery scheme in which they gambled on
the volume of stocks and bonds traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 124, 303
S.E.2d at 439.
4 Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2212.
5 Id. at 2213.
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pression hearing, contending that the prosecution would introduce
evidence at the hearing that would violate the privacy of persons
other than the defendants, thereby making the evidence inadmissi-
ble at trial under Georgia statutory law.6 Sitting without a jury, the
trial court ruled that the publication of wiretap evidence relating to
persons not then on trial would prevent its use in future prosecu-
tions.7 Consequently, the trial judge closed the suppression hearing
to all persons except witnesses, court personnel, the parties, and
their lawyers.8
The suppression hearing lasted seven days. 9 For less than two
and one-half hours, the prosecutor played wiretap tapes containing
names of persons not then on trial.10 At the close of the hearing,
the trial judge suppressed ten boxes of evidence containing docu-
ments that were personal and non-crime related. 1
Following their conviction by jury in open court, Petitioners ap-
pealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, 12 claiming, inter alia, that the
closure of the suppression hearing violated the standards for clo-
sure orders promulgated in a previous Georgia Supreme Court
case, R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin.13 In Lumpkin, the court, applying
the Georgia constitutional mandate that criminal defendants "shall
have a public . . . trial,' 4 ruled that closure orders must be nar-
rowly drawn and strictly construed in favor of open hearings. 15 Ad-
ditionally, the court held that a court may enter a closure order only
if it also enters written findings of fact fully articulating alternatives
to closure considered by the trial court, and the reasons why such
6 Id. (citing the Georgia Code of 1981, § 16-11-64(b)(8) (1982)). The Georgia stat-
utory provision is now embodied in GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3004(k) (1983):
Any publication of the information or evidence obtained under a warrant issued
hereunder other than that necessary and essential to the preparation of and actual
prosecution for the crime specified in the warrant shall be an unlawful invasion of
privacy under this Chapter, and shall cause such evidence and information to be
inadmissible in any criminal prosecution.
Id.




11 Id. The Court did not indicate whether the trial judge suppressed any portions of
the intercepted telephone conversations.
12 Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126, 303 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1983).
13 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982).
14 Id. at 578, 292 S.E.2d at 81'9 (citation omitted).
15 Id. at 580, 292 S.E.2d at 820. In Lumpkin, the court noted that alternatives to
closure would include jury sequestration, change of venue, postponement of trial,
searching voir dire, and clear and emphatic instructions to the jury to consider only
evidence presented in open court. Id. at 580 n.8, 292 S.E.2d at 820 n.8 (citing Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976)).
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alternatives would not afford the movant an adequate remedy.' 6
The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners' conten-
tion that the court's closure order violated the holding in Lumpkin,
stating that because the petitioners' hearing took place prior to
Lumpkin, the procedural requirements established in that case did
not apply. 17 The court also held that the trial court did not violate
the petitioners' sixth amendment right to a public trial. 18 Finding
that information contained in the tapes that the prosecution
presented at the hearing "would tend to violate the privacy of others
and might prejudice other potential defendants,"' 19 the court af-
firmed the trial court's balancing of the petitioners' right to a public
hearing against the privacy rights of others. 20
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
Georgia Supreme Court and remanded the case, 2' holding that a
defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial applies to a sup-
pression hearing and that the trial court had failed to give proper
weight to sixth amendment concerns. 22
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell characterized the case as
presenting the Court with three questions: First, does a defendant's
sixth amendment right to a public trial extend to a suppression
hearing conducted prior to the presentation of evidence to thejury?
Second, if so, did the trial court violate that right in the present
case? Third, if so, what is the appropriate remedy? 23
Citing a number of recent Supreme Court cases that establish a
first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings on the part
of the press and the public, 24 the Court held that the appropriate
16 Id. at 580, 292 S.E.2d at 820. The court also stipulated that closure orders must
provide that the closed portion of the hearing be reported, transcribed, and made avail-
able to the public and media as soon as the prejudicial effects that precipitated the clo-
sure no longer exist. Id. at 580-81, 292 S.E.2d at 820.
17 Waller v. State, 251 Ga. at 127, 303 S.E.2d at 441.
18 Id. at 127, 303 S.E.2d at 441.
19 Id. at 126, 303 S.E.2d at 441.
20 Id. at 127, 303 S.E.2d at 441.
21 Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2217.
22 Id. at 2214.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 2214-15 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819
(1984) (public's first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings applies to voir
dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 458 U.S. 596 (1982) (Mas-
sachusetts law providing for the exclusion of general public from trials of specified sex-
ual offenses involving victims under age of eighteen is unconstitutional limitation of
public's first amendment right of access to criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (press and public have qualified first amendment right
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test for deciding the constitutionality of closure orders entered in
suppression hearings over the objection of the defendant is promul-
gated in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court.25
In Press-Enterprise,26 a newspaper company attacked the consti-
tutionality of a trial court's decision to close the voir dire portion of
a trial for the rape and murder of a teenage girl.27 Focusing on first
amendment values and prior case law, the Court held that the voir
dire portion of a criminal trial is presumptively open to the public,
and that this
presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding in-
terest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to
be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing
court can determine whether the closure order was properly
entered.28
The Court in Walter applied the Press-Enterprise test for review-
ing the constitutionality of closure orders entered in suppression
hearings. 29 Recognizing that it had decided Press-Enterprise and the
other cited cases according to first amendment concerns, the Court
nevertheless emphasized that "there can be little doubt that the ex-
plicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of
a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press
and public."3 0
Applying the Press-Enterprise test to the facts of Waller, the Court
observed that the interest advanced by the Georgia Supreme Court,
protecting the privacy of persons not before the court,3 ' "under cer-
tain circumstances . . . may well justify closing portions of a sup-
pression hearing to the public."3 2 In Waller, however, the state
of access to criminal trials)). The Court also cited Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1978), in which a majority of the Justices concluded that the public had a qualified
constitutional right to attend pretrial suppression hearings. Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2215.
See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell,J., concurring) (basing right on first amendment); id.
at 406 (Blackmun,J., joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall,1J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (basing right on sixth amendment). The Waller Court pointed out
that each of the cited cases made clear that the right to an open trial may give way to
other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial, or the government's
interest in preventing disclosure of sensitive information. Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2215.
25 Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct.
819 (1984)).
26 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
27 Id. at 821.
28 Id. at 825.
29 Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2216.
30 Id. at 2215.
31 Waller v. State, 251 Ga. at 126-27, 303 S.E.2d at 441.
32 Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2216.
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failed to specify whose privacy interests the evidence might infringe,
how the evidence would infringe those interests, what portion of the
wiretap tapes might infringe those interests, and what portion of the
evidence consisted of the tapes. 33 Therefore, the trial court's find-
ings in support of closure were too broad and general to afford a
reviewing court an adequate basis for ascertaining whether the clo-
sure order was properly entered, and the closure itself was "far
more extensive than necessary." 34 Additionally, the Court found
that the trial court had failed to consider alternatives to closure.35
The Court remanded the case and ordered the state to conduct
a new suppression hearing at which time the state court should re-
consider the closure issue.36 The Court stipulated that the trial
court should consider conditions at the time of the new hearing and
weigh only those interests that continue to justify closure. 37 The
Court ordered the trial court to admit the public to significant por-
tions of the new suppression hearing unless "the state substantially
alters the evidence presented to support the wiretaps and
searches.3 8
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
The sixth amendment states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." 39 This
concept of the public trial dates back to ancient common law tradi-
tions.40 More recently, however, courts and legal scholars have ad-
33 Id.
34 Id. at 2217.
35 Id. at 2216-17. The Court noted that two possible alternatives to closure would be
"directing the government to provide more detail about its need for closure, in camera
if necessary, and closing only those parts of the hearing that jeopardized the interests
advanced" by the state. Id. at 2217.
36 Id. at 2217. Although agreeing with the "consistent view of the lower federal
courts that the defendant should not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to
obtain relief for a violation of the public trial guarantee," id. (citing Levine v. United
States, 362 U.S. 610, 627 n.* (1960) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting);
Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
3575 (1984)), the Court in Waller declined to order a new trial. Waller, 104 S. Ct. at
2217. It reasoned that if a new suppression hearing resulted in "essentially the same
evidence being suppressed," a new trial would be a "windfall" for the defendant and
contrary to the public interest. Id.
37 104 S. Ct. at 2217.
38 Id.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40 See generally Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932). Radin
indicates that the first mention of the public trial guarantee appears to have been in De
Republica Anglorum by Sir Thomas Smith, who, referring to the jury, noted that anyone
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vanced various societal and individual interests that the public trial
protects. 41 For instance, open trials advance society's interest in the
clearing up of truth. 42 Additionally, the open trial insures that " 'if
the judge be partial, his partiality and injustice will be evident to
bystanders.' "43
In addition to fostering society's interest in both seeking truth
and an impartial judiciary system, the public trial guarantee protects
" 'all persons accused of crime-the innocently accused, that they
may not become the victim of an unjust prosecution, as well as the
guilty, that they may be awarded a fair trial.'-44 Justice Harlan
highlighted this emphasis on the right to a public trial as a benefit to
the accused in Estes v. Texas,45 in which he stated, "the right of 'pub-
lic trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the
accused." '46
might hear what witnesses said in criminal trials. Id. at 382. Later, in 1670, Sir Matthew
Hale also wrote that criminal trials were open to the public. Id. According to one writer,
early Anglo-Saxon criminal trials were "open air meetings of the freemen who were
bound to attend them." See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 419 (1978) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting F. POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION
OF THE COMMON LAW 140 (1904)). Following the Norman Conquest, when English
courts established the jury trial, open criminal trials persisted, such that "by the 17th
Century, the concept of the public trial was firmly established under the common law."
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 420 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The acceptance of a right to a public trial in the American colonies came "largely
through the influence of the common law writers [such as Coke, Hale, and Blackstone]
whose views shaped the American Legal System." Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The first colonial charter emphasized the right of the
public rather than of the accused to attend trials. Id. The Pennsylvania Frame of Gov-
ernment of 1682, one of "the most influential of the colonial documents regarding the
protection of individual rights," stipulated that all trials be open to the public. Id. at
424-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing B. SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 130, 140 (1971)). Prior to the passage
of the Bill of Rights, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776, the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights, and the Vermont Constitutional Declaration of Rights all contained a
provision stipulating that criminal trials be open to the public. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 425-
26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
42 Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 421 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343,
345 (6th ed. 1820)).
43 Id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting M.
HALE, supra note 42, at 344 (emphasis in original)). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
270 (1948) (right to public trial is a "safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts
as instruments of persecution" because "[t]he knowledge that every criminal trial is sub-
ject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint
on possible abuse ofjudicial power").
44 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.25 (quoting People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50
N.W. 995, 998 (1891)).
45 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
46 Id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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A majority of Justices gave constitutional weight to this view in
Gannett v. DePasquale,4 7 which concerned a closure order entered
during a pretrial suppression hearing. Rejecting the petitioner's ar-
gument that the sixth amendment conferred a right to attend judi-
cial proceedings on the press and public, the Court held that the
right to a public trial is "personal to the accused," and exists for the
benefit of the accused.48
Despite its view that the right to a public trial belongs to the
accused, the Gannett Court did concede the existence of an in-
dependent public interest in the enforcement of this right:
There can be no blinking the fact that there is a strong societal interest
in public trials. Openness in court proceedings may improve the qual-
ity of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with rele-
vant testimony, cause all trial participants to perform their duties more
conscientiously, and generally give the public an opportunity to ob-
serve the judicial system. 49
Thus courts and legal scholars have struggled to balance the
rights and interests of the accused and the public in open judicial
proceedings. Those interests often conflict, and Waller v. Georgia
represents the Supreme Court's most recent effort to resolve that
conflict.
B. THE WALLER DECISION
In Waller, the Court once again discussed society's various inter-
ests in preserving the right to a public trial. It recognized that the
open trial discourages both abuse ofjudicial power 50 and perjury. 5 1
The Court emphasized, however, that "the central aim of a criminal
47 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
48 Id. at 379-80.
49 Id. at 383 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren, CJ., concur-
ring)). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Gannett also stressed that the right to a public trial
serves important societal functions. Judges, prosecutors, and police officials are often
elected and the main source of information on their official performance is the open
trial. Id. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The right to
an open trial reflects "the notion deeply rooted in the common law that 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.' " Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960)). Open
trials therefore help to maintain public confidence in the judicial system by allowing the
citizenry to observe the workings of the court. Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Additionally, the open trial plays "an important role as an
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotions" so that "members of the commu-
nity are less likely to act as self-appointed law enforcers or vigilantes." Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (3rd Cir. 1980).




proceeding must be to try the accused fairly," 52 and that a public
trial protects this right of the accused.53 The Court noted that these
policies and rights have special force with respect to suppression
hearings because suppression hearings determine what evidence
will be admitted at trial and therefore have a direct effect on the
verdict. 54
As previously noted, the Court in Waller held that the test
promulgated in Press-Enterprise55 is the proper standard for ascer-
taining the constitutionality of closure orders entered in suppres-
sion hearings. 56 Thus, the Court held that:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding and it must make
findings adequate to support closure. 57
The procedural requirement of this test seems to present no
difficulties to a trial court considering closure. The test clearly stip-
ulates that the trial judge is to articulate which "overriding inter-
ests" overcome the defendant's presumed right to an open trial, and
also to make specific findings that indicate the basis for the closure
order.
In promulgating this test, however, the Court has provided lit-
tle guidance to lower courts regarding the nature of an "overriding
interest."58 Thus trial judges are left to formulate their own defini-
tions of an "overriding interest." Under such circumstances, the
Waller test may cause trial judges to close judicial proceedings for
reasons that do not sufficiently outweigh the strong societal inter-
ests weighing in favor of open trials. Therefore, this vague standard
may create unnecessary delays in criminal trials because defendants
will appeal closure orders on the grounds that the interest cited
does not override their interest in a public trial.
In light of the difficulties that the Waller test places upon trial
courts, a more appropriate test should be one that defines public
policy considerations that justify closure ofjudicial proceedings. G.
Michael Fenner and James L. Koley have identified four categories
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2215-16.
55 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
56 Waler, 104 S. Ct. at 2216.
57 Id.
58 See In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1984), for a discussion of various




of possible justifications for closure: 1) fair administration of jus-
tice; 2) national security; 3) protection of confidential investigative
information; and 4) legally protected state and private confi-
dences. 59
The first justification concerns the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to a fair trial.60 The defendant's interest in an impartial
jury would override the guarantee to a public trial if the "publicity
generated at an open pre-trial proceeding will prejudice the jury
pool against the defendant." 6' Likewise, the defendant's interest in
a fair trial also may override the public trial guarantee when the trial
court cannot compel witnesses to testify in an open courtroom. 62 In
either situation, the trial court must recognize that "the central aim
of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly." 63 There-
fore, the defendant's right to a fair trial would override other soci-
etal interests in open trials, and the trial court should close the
proceeding to the public.
Fenner and Koley next assert that national security interests
also may justify closing judicial proceedings.6 Courts have invoked
national security as a justification for curbing first amendment
rights, 65 and similar policy considerations would dictate closure of a
suppression hearing to protect national security. National security
is an "interest which can justify infringement of the 'almost insur-
mountable protection' [that the first amendment provides] against
prior restraints." 66 Because the first and sixth amendments are
equally protective of the open trial,67 when national security inter-
59 Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspaper and Beyond, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 415-44 (1981).
60 Id. at 440 (citing Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-87 (1978)).
61 Id. at 441.
62 Id. Such a contingency might occur if "a witness' fear of retaliation or a psycho-
logical block against relating. . . facts in public" prevents that witness from testifying in
open court. Id.
63 104 S. Ct. at 2215. As one court noted, "There is little to be gained by admitting
the public to pretrial proceedings in order to promote the appearance of fairness if the
very presence of the public makes a fair trial impossible." In re Globe Newspapers Co.,
729 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1983). Likewise, Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Gan-
nett that the sixth amendment's "presumption in favor of open proceedings . . .does
not require that all proceedings be held in open court when to do so would deprive a
defendant of a fair trial." Gannett, 443 U.S. at 439 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
64 Fenner & Koley, supra note 59, at 441.
65 Id. at 441-42 n.134 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
66 Id. at 442 n.133 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
67 Walter, 104 S. Ct. at 2215.
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ests are strong enough to overcome the first amendment right of
access to judicial proceedings, such interests will likewise override
the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial.
Protection of confidential investigative information from public
dissemination is the third interest that may override first and sixth
amendment presumptions in favor of open hearings.68 "Public pol-
icy considerations may support confidentiality. . . to the extent that
the effectiveness of a lawful investigative technique depends on
keeping details from those investigated .... *"69 This interest may
be especially compelling in the context of a suppression hearing be-
cause the court may find itself scrutinizing the details of ongoing
investigations .70
The final category of interests that may justify closure of a sup-
pression hearing over the defendant's objections comprises "impor-
tant state and private confidences recognized by law . . .[such as]
trade secrets and an individual's right to privacy." 7' For example,
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
196872 regulates the interception and disclosure of wire and oral
communications; one of its purposes is to protect the privacy of
such communications. 73 Thus, a trial court might find that the pri-
vacy interests of people implicated through intercepted communica-
tion override first and sixth amendment rights of public trials and
hearings.
It is important to note that the presence of interests in one or
more of these four categories does not necessarily warrant the find-
ing that such interests will override the guarantee of a public trial. 74
"[T]he presumption of openness must be overcome on the facts of
each particular case . . . . 75 These four categories, however,
would enable a trial court to more easily identify an interest as over-
riding or not, and thus reduce long and costly delays due to appeals
of closure orders.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Waller, that a trial court may not close a
68 Fenner & Koley, supra note 59, at 443 (citing Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
398 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972)).
69 Id. at 443.
70 Id.
71 Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 n.5 (1980)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. 1985).
73 United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978).




suppression hearing over the objection of the defendant unless the
trial judge satisfies the Press-Enterprise test, is correct given the im-
portant societal policies that the open trial serves. Nevertheless, the
Court's stipulation that an interest must be overriding before clo-
sure can occur may cause confusion on the part of the trial courts.
Fenner and Koley's four categories provide trial courts with a
clearer guide to what may constitute an overriding interest. Such
guidance will insure that the defendant's right to public trial and
society's interest in insuring the existence of that right are not cur-
tailed unless sufficiently countervailing interests present themselves.
In combination with the Waller requirements-that the closure
be narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest, that the trial
court consider alternatives to closure, and that the trial court make
and articulate findings adequate to support closure-this four-cate-
gory approach to determining when an interest is sufficiently over-
riding to justify closure will insure that courts do not arbitrarily
sacrifice first and sixth amendment rights to open suppression
hearings.
LOGAN MUNROE CHANDLER
812 [Vol. 75
